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*
In July 2001, the Commission presented a Communication on Promoting Core
Labour Standards and Improving Social Governance in the Context of
Globalization  (COM(2001)416 final, 18.7.2001, hereafter ‘Promoting Core
Labour Standards’). The Communication contained two key proposals. First,
that the EU play a more direct role in the International Labour Organisation
(ILO) and the international community as a whole in the promotion of core
labour standards. Second, that the EU continue and extend existing practice,
whereby trade access to the EU and provision of EU development aid is made
conditional on compliance with core labour standards. The stated aim of the
Commission is to give an ethical basis to its actions in the field of trade and aid,
and to use the political influence of the European Union within the international
community so as to mitigate the more harmful effects of globalisation. This is
intended to satisfy ‘growing public interest’ in ‘the creation of an equitable
global economic system’ (Promoting Core Labour Standards, 3).
This was one of a series of policy documents issued by the Commission
during that month. Others included the Communication on  The European
Union’s Role in Promoting Human Rights and Democratisation in Third
Countries (COM(2001) 252 final, 8.7.2001), the Green Paper on Promoting a
European Framework for Corporate Social Responsibility (COM(2001)366
final, 18.7.2001, hereafter ‘Corporate Social Responsibility’) and the White
Paper on  European Governance (COM(2001)428, 25.7.2001, hereafter
‘European Governance’). All were concerned with the articulation of principled
objectives, in a variety of spheres, and can be regarded as a response to the
eloquent pleas of legal and political commentators for the EU to pay attention to
these matters (See, for example, Alston 1999).
As a mere ‘Communication’,  Promoting Core Labour Standards was
likely to be among the least influential and went largely unnoticed amidst the
flurry of attention with which the  European Governance  White Paper was
received. However, it is a policy document which is likely to be of interest to
both labour lawyers and those concerned with the constitutional and political
evolution of the European Union.
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series. All errors are the writer’s own.2
The proposals set out in Promoting Core Labour Standards  reveal how
far the EU has come since its founding members assented to the Treaty of Rome
in 1957. At that stage, the promotion of labour standards was considered to be
largely outside the remit of the legitimate concerns of the European Community
(Davies 1992). Moreover, the improvement of such conditions abroad was
considered a matter solely for the foreign policy of Member States. Now it is
evident that the Commission regards it as the role of the Union, rather than that
of Member States, to ‘reinforce global social governance’ ( Promoting Core
Labour Standards 2001, 13). This proposal can also be linked to the broader
ambition, expressed in  European Governance, for the EU to ‘speak with a
single voice’ on the global stage so as to strengthen its representation in
international organisations.
1 The results of consultation on this and other
matters raised by the White Paper is to be the subject of a Commission report at
the end of 2002. In the meantime, the Laeken Declaration has also asked:
‘Should the external representation of the Union in international fora be
extended further?’
2
There is a temptation to see the extension of EU powers in the
international sphere as an unmitigated good, especially when these are directed
at achieving protection of fundamental human rights, including workers’ rights.
In this context, the policies of the EU are often contrasted with the deregulatory
agenda currently being pursued by another key international actor, the United
States of America (Habermas 1999, Hutton 2002). Nevertheless, it seems worth
investigating the merits of EU intervention more thoroughly and carefully. This
paper does so from the perspective of EU competence.
The paper begins by outlining the context within which these proposals
have been made: namely, the current debate over social conditionality and
governance. Next, it sets out the actual content of the proposals made by the
Commission in Promoting Core Labour Standards. The paper then proceeds to
consider whether the proposed extension of external competence in the field of
core labour standards is defensible on legal and ethical grounds.
On the question of legal competence, it emerges that further policy
initiatives relating to trade and development would seem to fall within the
                                                
1 See European Governance, 3, 5, 7, 26-7 and 30. This White Paper proposal draws heavily
on the work of the White Paper on Governance Working Group No. 5, Report of Working
Group: Strengthening Europe’s Contribution to World Governance, May 2001 (hereafter
‘World Governance’).
2 ‘The Future of the EU: Declaration of Laeken’, available at
http://www.eu2001.be/Main/Frameset.asp?reference=01-01&lang=en&sess=595426166&.3
powers of the EU under the Treaty Establishing the European Community.
3 As
regards trade, the EU may assert exclusive competence; while as regards
development, competence will be shared between the EU and the Member
States. The doubt only arises as to whether increased EU representation within
the ILO and the international community at large would be lawful, in particular
as regards those core labour standards which are not enforceable under EU law,
namely freedom of association and collective bargaining. This would be the
sole basis on which a legal challenge could be mounted before the European
Court of Justice to the implementation of the Commission’s proposals. This is
also an important reminder of the value of ‘coherence’, a concept stressed by
the White Paper on European Governance.
The legitimacy of EU external policy will not, however, be assessed
solely by whether it meets the basic requirement of compliance with the rule of
law, but also by virtue of its ethical quality. Moreover, the merits of EU action
will not be determined by reference only to the content of the labour standards
which the Union seeks to promote, but how it does so. For this reason, the
issues of EU inter-institutional competence and ‘good governance’ raised in
European Governance will be relevant. The mode by which the EU is
represented in international fora therefore requires further consideration before
Commission proposals become operational. Moreover, the procedural
mechanisms by which trade and aid preferences are extended and revoked may
need greater attention, in the light of fears of arbitrary application and
protectionism.
Finally, if the EU hopes to persuade its citizens and other international
actors of the sincerity of its concern and the legitimacy of its actions,
precautions must be taken not to appear hypocritical. In particular, it may be
important that the EU does not require of other States what it is not expected of
an EU Member State in terms of compliance with core labour standards. This is
not only a moral and a political imperative, but also potentially has legal
consequences under Article XX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.
At present, it would seem that this may require something less than application
of the ‘core labour standards’ applied by the International Labour Organisation.
This is true of at least the field of freedom of association and effective
protection of the right to collective bargaining, unless further action is taken to
extend the internal competence of the EU in this regard.
                                                
3 In this paper, the term ‘European Community’ (or ‘EC’) is used to refer to the ‘European
Economic Community’ in the period prior to entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty on
European Union 1992 (TEU). It is also used, where appropriate, to refer to the powers or
action taken under the Treaty Establishing the European Community (ECT), which was the
successor to the Treaty of Rome. However, as the Commission proposals tend to speak of EU
competence as subsuming EC competence, this paper does likewise.4
THE CONTEXT: DEBATES OVER CONDITIONALITY
AND GOVERNANCE
The 2001 Communication on  Promoting Core Labour Standards can be
understood in the context of two ongoing debates. To some extent, this context
was recognised in the Communication itself, which set out in some detail the
background to the present controversy over social conditionality in the
international community. Moreover, the promotion good global ‘governance’
was given as a reason for the adoption of these proposals, even though the
content of this concept was not elaborated upon in detail. Issues relating to
European governance in the sense of inter-institutional competence were not
addressed, despite their potential impact upon the execution of the proposals
contained in the Communication. These were left instead to amplification in the
White Paper, which also introduced the precepts of ‘good global governance’.
Conditionality: The Debate Over the Effective Global Enforcement
of Core Labour Standards
The promotion of core labour standards on the international stage has been
chiefly the responsibility of the ILO, of which EU States are Members. Each
State delegation to the ILO International Labour Conference is tripartite,
consisting of two government representatives, one worker representative and
one employer representative. The unique participatory structure of the
Organisation has led some to recommend the ILO as a model for the
involvement of civil society in other international organisations (Palmer 1992,
278-82 and Trimble 1997, 167-168). The EU is not itself a Member of the
Organisation, but the Commission has special standing at the International
Labour Conference. Although its interventions are generally limited to broad
statements of policy,
4 its capacity to influence policy within that Organisation
has been the subject of some conflict with Member States.
5 This conflict was
not mentioned in the Communication. Instead, reference was made to the
valuable standard-setting role played by the ILO on the world stage.
                                                
4 See for example, the speeches made by Commissioner Diamontopoulou at
http://www.ilc.ilo.org/ilc2000/speeches and http://www.ilc.ilo.org/ilc2001/speeches.
5 Opinion 2/91 regarding ILO Convention No. 170 on chemicals at work, Decision of 19
March 1993 [1993] ECR I-1061; see also [1993] CMLR 800. See also  Proposal for a
Council Decision on the Exercise of the Community’s External Competence at International
Labour Conferences in Cases Falling within the Joint Competence of the Community and its
Member States COM(94)2 final 12.01.94, published also in (1994)  IJCLLIR 175. These
initiatives are discussed further below.5
This has been achieved by the adoption of ILO Conventions at the
International Labour Conference. Even more significant has been the
identification of ‘core labour standards’ by the international community,
initially at the 1995 World Summit for Social Development
6 and then by the
1998 ILO Declaration of Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work.
7 Those
core labour standards consist of:
1. Freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to
collective bargaining.
2. Elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labour.
3. Effective abolition of child labour.
4. Elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and
occupation.
These are taken to be reflected in eight ‘core’ ILO conventions. These are
Convention Nos. 87 and 98 on freedom of association and collective bargaining
(1948 and 1949); Conventions Nos. 29 and 105 on the elimination of all forms
of forced and compulsory labour (1930 and 1957); ILO Convention No. 138 on
the minimum age for admission to employment (1973); ILO Conventions Nos.
100 and 111 on the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and
occupation (1957 and 1958); and ILO Convention No. 182 on the worst forms
of child labour (1999).
The difficulty identified by the Commission is that, laudable as these
labour standards may be, they are not readily enforceable. By refusing to ratify
an ILO Convention, a State can claim that it is not bound by the norms which it
contains. (As to the conduct of the USA in this regard, see Compa 2001, Gross
1999 and Nolan and Prosser 2000). Moreover, even ratifying States may omit to
supply reports or chose to overlook the recommendations of ILO supervisory
bodies as to what is required to achieve compliance with a Convention. There is
no ready sanction for a breach. It is only in the most extreme circumstances that
a Member State will be expelled.
8 The ILO merely offers ‘technical assistance’
for States to help them comply. It is unfortunate that the funds devoted to this
task cannot compete with the incentives provided by the IMF and World Bank
under what were their ‘Structural Adjustment’ policies (now known as ‘Poverty
                                                
6 World Social Summit held at Copenhagen, 6-12 March 1995. See Final Declaration,
Commitment 3.
7 Adopted in the International Labour Conference, with 273 votes in favour, none against and
43 abstentions.
8 The most recent example is Myanmar (Burma). See Resolution on the Widespread Use of
Forced Labour in Myanmar, ILC, 87
th Session (ILO, 1999), available on
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/10ilc/ilc87/com-myan.htm.6
Growth Reduction’), which made access to funding conditional on deregulatory
policies.
9 These limitations appear to often render ILO standards ineffective.
Another avenue by which core labour standards can be promoted is via
‘corporate responsibility’. Fundamental workers’ rights were included in the
1999 ‘Global Compact’,
10 the 2000 OECD Guidelines on Multinational
Enterprises,
11 and the Revised ILO Tripartite Declaration of Principles.
12 There
have also been various initiatives taken unilaterally by corporations to introduce
‘codes of conduct’ and ‘social labelling’ (Sabel, O'Rourke and Fung 1999).
13
Such measures constitute a departure from traditional forms of international
regulation, insofar as they place an onus on actors other than States to take
responsibility for implementing core labour standards. The problem remains
that of enforcement.
14 Further initiatives are currently being considered by a
‘World Commission on the Social Dimensions of Globalisation’, established by
the ILO, whose aim is to co-ordinate the programmes of diverse international
organisations and actors so as to ensure the efficient and consistent provision of
resources to States who wish to comply with core labour standards.
15
‘By comparison, the World Trade Organisation (WTO) with its rules-
based system and binding dispute settlement mechanism, is a strong and
                                                
9 See Reducing the Decent Work Deficit – A Global Challenge (2001) ILC, 89
th Session, 46.
An international symposium was held on 24-8 September 2001 designed to promote the co-
operation that has been lacking to date. See
http:www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/inf/pr/2001/30.htm.
10 See http://65.214.34.30/un/gc/unweb.nsf/.
11 See http://www.oecd.org/. Also Murray 2001a. Note that this supplements the existing ILO
Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy
1977, revised in 2001, which involves regular reporting as to compliance, discussed in
Reducing the Decent Work Deficit – A Global Challenge, ILC, 89
th Session (ILO, 2001), 26.
12 See ILO, Report of the Director-General: Reducing the Decent Work Deficit– A Global
Challenge (2001) ILC, 89
th Session, 26; and  Seventh Survey on the Effect given to the
Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social
Policy: Analytical Report of the Working Group on the Reports Submitted by Governments
and by Employers’ and Workers’ Organizations (2001) GB.280/MNE/1/1.
13 See also for discussion of such initiatives, Joint Report on the Main Issues Emerging from
the EU-US I Symposium on Codes of Conduct and International Labour Standards (1998).
14 For example, Myanmar (Burma) has been ejected from membership of the ILO for use of
forced labour and the USA has banned any further investment in that State, but the USA
remains the leading importer of Burmese textiles and USA corporations continue to work on
projects which directly benefit the current regime.
See http://www.ilc.ilo.org/ilc2001/speeches/5_1T275.asp?delcode+1817. Also Hepple 1999.
15 This has its origins in the ILO Working Party of the same title. See ILO Governing Body
Paper, ‘Enhancing the Action of the Working Party on the Social Dimension of
Globalisation: Next Steps’ (2001) GB.282/WP/SDG/1, 282
nd Session. The membership of the
World Commission is now determined and it is to meet for the first time on 25 March 2002.
See www.ilo.org/public/english/ecsdg/index.htm.7
relatively effective organisation’ (Promoting Core Labour Standards 2001, 3).
However, the linkage of compliance with core labour standards to trade access
has been vigorously opposed by developing States within the ILO.
16 The
European Commission, together with the US Clinton administration, sought at
World Trade Organisation (WTO) Ministerial Meetings in Singapore and
Seattle to overcome this opposition to a ‘social clause’. They were, however, no
more successful in this forum than they had been within the ILO.
17
This reaction is indicative of the deep distrust by the ‘South’ of the role
played by the ‘North’ in world governance. In particular, it is feared that such
standards may be given a scope and breadth that impinges on the comparative
advantage of States who are already disadvantaged in world markets; namely
that industrialised States seek only to protect domestic producers from overseas
competition and to prevent capital flight. ‘Developing’ States fear that
enforcement of core labour standards will either be arbitrary in manner or
calculated by industrialised States to prevent fair competition.
18
The claim that implementation of core labour standards will damage
developing economies does not seem to be borne out by the available evidence.
OECD studies have observed that compliance with certain core labour
standards, especially those relating to freedom of association and collective
bargaining, may create rather than reduce comparative advantage.
19 Moreover,
there is a powerful ‘human rights argument’ for the enforcement of the core
labour standards (Langille 1997, 35). The reluctance of States in the South to
agree to an international mechanism for this purpose is more readily
understandable, in that it may cause them detriment if it does not operate fairly.
If the North is to demonstrate the legitimacy of such a mechanism, there needs
to be careful consideration of the means by which social conditionality is
introduced (Charny 2001).
In the Communication on  Promoting Core Labour Standards, the
Commission appeared to be resigned  to resistance to the introduction of a
‘social clause’ under auspices of the WTO, even though the presentation of this
                                                
16 See, for example, the response in the ILO Working Group on Globalisation prior to
discussions at the WTO Ministerial Meeting in Singapore (1995) ILO GB.262/WP/SDL/1/2,
262
nd Session.
17 Similarly, arguments had been made for the inclusion of labour standards in a ‘Multilateral
Agreement on Investment’ (MAI) but talks collapsed when no consensus could be reached on
its terms. See Compa 1998.
18 Such fears are expressed in the wording of the 1998 ILO Declaration, Article 5. See also
Langille 1999 and Summers 2001.
19  Trade, Employment and Labour Standards: A Study of Core Workers’ Rights and
International Trade (1996) and International Trade and Core Labour Standards (2000).8
document preceded the Ministerial meeting at Doha.
20 The Communication
stated, in a manner reminiscent of the WTO Ministerial Declaration at
Singapore,
21 that ‘the ILO is, and must remain, the organisation competent to
set and deal with labour standards, and a rebalancing of the global system
should seek to strengthen the social pillar by taking its starting point in the ILO
mechanisms, not in the WTO’ ( Promoting Core Labour Standards, 3). What
also remained viable was the unilateral promotion of core labour standards by
the EU, by making compliance with these a condition of trade agreements and
development aid.
Governance: The Desire for Legitimacy
‘Governance’ has been posited as the desirable alternative to more coercive
forms of top-down ‘government’. The aim is to allow a wide range of
participants in the development of legal and social norms, who will then obey
these by virtue of their perceived merit rather than any sanction which is
imposed in respect of disobedience. The end point has been described as ‘the
intentional regulation of social relationships and the underlying conflicts by
reliable and durable means and institutions…’ (Jachtenfuchs 2001, 246. See
also Curtin 1997, Habermas 1996, and Nino 1996). The quest for an ideal form
of European and international ‘governance’ is ultimately a quest for legitimacy.
The grail would seem to lie in the realm of identification of the most
appropriate transnational standards by the most appropriate means (in terms of
both participants and procedures).
The Communication on  Promoting Core Labour Standards focused on
the end product, namely the kinds of standards that should be promoted on the
international stage. The Commission observed that ‘global market governance
has developed more quickly than global social governance’ creating an
‘imbalance’ which must be corrected. The Commission therefore proposed an
‘EU initiative to move international action forward’ on this basis ( Promoting
Core Labour Standards 2001, 12). The claim made was that citizens expect a
powerful Union on a world stage and that public interest in this issue is high
(European Governance 2001, 26-27; and Promoting Core Labour Standards
2001, 3).
What is interesting is that, while good governance is usually portrayed as
consensual and non-coercive, the Communication appeared to prioritise the
‘effective’ enforcement of core labour standards over other values recognised in
                                                
20 See the Doha 2001 WTO Ministerial Briefing Notes available on:  http://www-chil.wto-
ministerial.org/english/thewto_/e/min01_e/brief16_e.htm.
21 1996 Singapore WTO Ministerial Declaration, para. 4.9
the White Paper. The others listed there being  ‘openness’, ‘participation’,
‘accountability’ and ‘coherence’ (European Governance 2001, 10-11).
In the White Paper, significant attention was paid to these diverse values
in the context of the ways in which the inter-institutional competence within the
Union is demarcated. These issues have been and continue to be the subject of
debate (see, for example, Joerges et al 2001, De Schutter et al 2001 and Scott
and Trubek 2001). Yet, in the White Paper section on ‘the EU’s contribution to
global governance’, considerable emphasis was placed on effectiveness of
international organisations. For example it was said that  ‘the goal should ‘be to
boost the effectiveness and enforcement powers of multi-lateral organisations’
(European Governance 2001, 27). There was said to be scope for soft law
measures, which are ‘new tools’ that the EU could also promote at the global
level. These would consist of ‘peer review of progress made towards agreed
targets’ and ‘development of co-regulatory solutions’. Yet, above all else, the
aim was to be for the Union to ‘strengthen its representation in international and
regional fora’. Not only is international law to be effective but the EU is to
become an effective international actor, with the Commission as its
representative (European Governance 2001, 27).
It is, however, arguably curious that the Commission did not refer to its
recent difficulty in persuading Member States of the merits of its claim to
exclusive competence. Examples include its efforts as regards the GATS or
TRIPS agreements (Cremona 2000 and Meunier and Nicolaidis 1999), or its
desire to represent Member States in the context of ILO standard-setting on the
ILO Chemicals at Work Convention No. 170 (see endnote 5, above).
Controversy over such issues was not directly addressed in the White Paper
discussion of ‘global governance’ or in the Communication on Promoting Core
Labour Standards. To this extent, the issues of ‘participation’ and
‘accountability’ raised elsewhere appeared to be disregarded. It may be that
‘effectiveness’ is what is required in EU foreign policy over and above other
any other aspiration, but by its failure to address other values, the Commission’s
White Paper did not make out this case.10
THE CONTENT OF THE 2001 COMMISSION PROPOSALS
The 2001 Commission proposals had two dimensions. The first was the
expansion of the EU representative role in the ILO and the international
community generally, so as to secure implementation of core labour standards.
The second was the extension of EU trade and aid conditionality to achieve the
same ends.
The EU Role in the ILO
The Commission’s ambitions as regards the ILO have to be understood in the
context of the present role played by EU Member States within that
Organisation. Within the International Labour Conference, government
representatives from countries with industrialised market economies (IMEC)
usually take a similar stance on policies and sometimes speak with one voice.
This group includes the EU Member States and the USA. The European
Commissioner responsible for Employment and Social Affairs tends to make
more general statements in the International Labour Conference, rather than in
debates on the adoption of particular Conventions (see endnote 4 above).
Employer and worker representatives from each EU Member State either speak
independently or in tandem with the Employers’ and Workers’ Groups that
dominate ILO debates. From 1990-1994, the European Commission explicitly
sought exclusive external competence to conclude ILO Conventions on matters
which were of direct relevance to existing EC Directives.
22 However, this
initiative was resisted by Member States and, ultimately, by the Court of
Justice. Ten years later, the Commission appears to be making a renewed bid to
acquire standing within the ILO, this time in respect of constitutional revision of
ILO supervisory procedures and methods for implementation of core labour
standards.
The Commission’s focus in the 2001 Communication was on the present
limitations of enforcement mechanisms for the implementation of ILO
standards ( Promoting Core Labour Standards 2001, 3). First, greater weight
was to be given to the findings of the Committee of Experts, the expert body
responsible for providing an assessment of compliance with ILO Conventions.
The reason given was the considerable power wielded by the Conference
Committee, made up of delegates from the International Labour Conference,
                                                
22 Opinion 2/91 regarding ILO Convention No. 170 on Chemicals at Work, Decision of 19
March 1993 [1993] ECR I-1061; see also [1993] CMLR 800. See also  Proposal for a
Council Decision on the Exercise of the Community’s External Competence at International
Labour Conferences in Cases Falling within the Joint Competence of the Community and its
Member States COM(94)2 final 12.01.94, published also in (1994)  IJCLLIR 175. These
initiatives are discussed further below.11
which makes the final, often politically motivated recommendations to ILO
Member States. Second, it was proposed that there should be a more systematic
follow-up to such observations, including enhanced technical assistance. Third,
it was said that greater publicity should be given to ILO control mechanisms.
Findings of ILO supervisory bodies should, it seems, also have additional
weight when deciding disputes relating to core labour standards in the context
of trade and aid conditionality ( Promoting Core Labour Standards 2001, 13-
15). In addition, the EU should promote a forum for international dialogue to
ensure that other international organisations co-operated with the ILO as it
sought to achieve these objectives ( Promoting Core Labour Standards 2001,
15-16).
There is little doubt that the proposed action by the EU, such as
promoting co-operation between international agencies, which is already
contemplated by the new ILO World Commission, could alleviate difficulties
faced by the ILO as regards enforcement of core labour standards. Moreover,
giving the findings of ILO expert supervisory bodies greater status can also be
seen as beneficial, even from the perspective of developing States, to the extent
that they seek to end to arbitrary application of conditionality. However, while
the objectives of EU competence presented by the Commission seem worthy,
what was not altogether explained is why this action within an international
organisation should be regarded as the role of the EU as opposed to delegations
from Member States.
Nor was the reader of Promoting Core Labour Standards informed how
such a change in the EU representative role should be achieved. It would seem
from the 2001 exchange of letters between Commissioner Diamontopoulou and
the ILO Director-General, Juan Somavia, that there will be additional ‘high-
level’ meetings between the Commission and the International Labour Office.
23
In addition, the President of the Commission and the ILO Director-General will
still meet to consider developments that have implications for co-operation
between the two parties. Also, the ILO and the Commission will continue to
have discussions relating to project financing of technical assistance. However,
it is not self-evident that these channels would be sufficient to achieve the
Commission’s objectives.
                                                
23 See the most recent ‘exchange of letters’ between Anna Diamantopoulou, Commissioner
for Employment and Social Affairs and Juan Somavia, Director-General of the ILO, on 14
May 2001, which supplements the last such exchange in 1989. These letters elaborate on the
terms of co-operation between the ILO and the EU. See:
http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/news/2001/jun/letter1_en.html.12
There were no detailed proposals as to how the EU voice would be
constituted. Little attention was paid to the logistics of EU inter-institutional
competence, such as the relative roles of the Council and Parliament. All that
we know is that the Commission is to act as the ‘executive’ in ‘international
representation of the Community’, and this is stated in the White Paper, not in
the Commission Communication on  Promoting Core Labour Standards
(European Governance 2001, 30-31).
It does seem that the Commission envisages a continuing role for
decision-making by the ‘social partners’ and consultation of the Economic and
Social Committee (Promoting Core Labour Standards 2001, 11). In addition,
the Commission wishes to draw upon the capacity of local NGOs and civil
society organisations in non-Member States to publicise ILO standards and
monitor compliance under trade and aid agreements, but whether this is to be
the sum total of their involvement is unclear. The extent to which this form of
participation, which extends beyond the established tripartite norm, is
appropriate within the ILO is currently being raised for review within that
Organisation.
24
EU Trade and Aid
Even though the creation of a global ‘social clause’ under WTO auspices has
foundered, the EU has acted on its own initiative, requiring compliance with
ILO core labour standards within the ‘Generalised System of Preferences’
(GSP) and in trade and development aid agreements. The proposal in the 2001
Communication on  Promoting Core Labour Standards  was that these be
developed and elaborated upon.
The GSP is a mechanism under which industrialised States can grant non-
reciprocal trade preferences to developing nations, which constitutes an
exception to the principle of ‘most favoured nation status’ under the General
Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT) now regulated through the WTO. ILO
Conventions Nos. 87, 98 and 138 have been included in the GSP as a basis for
preferential trade access. Provision has also been made for EC temporary
withdrawal of such preferences where the beneficiary country practices slavery,
forced labour or is seeking to export goods made by prison labour.
25
                                                
24 See  Report of the Director-General: Reducing the Decent Work Deficit – A Global
Challenge, ILC, 89
th Session (ILO, 2001), 46-8 and Cooney 1999.
25 EC Council Regulation No. 2820/98 of 21.12.1998 OJ L357/1, Arts. 8-21. See for details
of these special incentives in terms of tariffs, Trade Policy Review: European Union 2001
WT/TPR/S/72 (WTO, 2000) Vol. 1, 36, Box II.5.13
The EU has received WTO dispensation to enter into certain preferential
trade agreements, which introduce social conditionality. An example, is the
2000 Cotonou Agreement, the successor to the Lomé Conventions,
26 which
confirms the parties’ commitment to ‘core labour standards’ and states that one
of the aims of co-operation will be to ‘respect… basic social rights’, although
this is not to be used for ‘protectionist purposes’.
27
While the United States administration has been prepared to impose trade
sanctions in response to a failure to comply with core labour standards
(Summers 2001 and Tsogas 2000), the official position of the European
Commission has been and remains that the EU is only seeking to ensure that
trade and development incentives could be made conditional on compliance
(Promoting Core Labour Standards  2001, Annex 1). Nevertheless, in practice,
the distinction between the two positions is not so radical as the Commission’s
rhetoric might suggest. A State would still suffer relative disadvantage if it were
unable to demonstrate compliance with such standards. The denial that this
policy involves of any form of coercion is consistent with the rhetoric of
‘governance’, but is perhaps deceptive given that States which do not comply
are, in effect, punished by exclusion from these benefits.
The Commission proposed that the current system of trade preferences
under GSP be enhanced, by widening the trade preferences under incentives
schemes, increasing the transparency and streamlining procedures and making
effective enforcement of all four core labour standards a precondition for receipt
of incentives. Moreover, the EU should require that all eight core ILO
Conventions be transposed into the domestic law of beneficiary States. In line
with existing ILO practice, the intention is to accompany these conditions with
technical assistance to help countries achieve these goals ( Promoting Core
Labour Standards 2001, 16-17).
Also, the Commission proposed that unilateral suspension of
development co-operation or GSP benefits should take place only after an ILO
complaints procedure relating to breach of a core labour standard has been
followed (Promoting Core Labour Standards 2001, 14). It will be interesting to
see what the Court of Justice would make of this demarcation of jurisprudence
and whether this would be agreed to within the WTO.
28 On the one hand, this
                                                
26 See for discussion of its content and effect the Commission Staff Working Document
D(2001) 32947 at 88 et seq. The provisional WTO Decision of 14 November 2001,
WT/MIN(01)/15, on its status is available at:
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_acp_ec_agre_e.htm.
27 Cotonou Agreement 2000, Articles 25 and Article 50.
28  As regards the reluctance of the Court of Justice to cede competence to the European
Court of Human Rights, Opinion 2/94 [1996] ECR I-2827, discussed in detail below.14
may be the most promising aspect of the Commission’s proposals, in that such a
procedure might deter arbitrary or politically motivated decisions to suspend
trade or aid provision (cf. Smith 1997). What is uncertain is how ILO
supervisory procedures might have to be modified to play that role (and what
part the EU would take in the redesign of such procedures).
In addition, Promoting Core Labour Standards contemplated that States
could comply with the terms set out in trade and aid agreements by facilitating
the use of alternative tools of governance, such as social labelling and industry
codes of conduct.
29 This would also seem to follow from a general emphasis on
non-coercive forms of governance which recognise the importance of networks
of civil society actors. Nevertheless, this concession was said to be subject to
stringent limitations.
State beneficiaries of EU trade preferences and development aid are to
ensure that any corporate responsibility schemes introduced are objective,
transparent and non-discriminatory. There must be ‘coherence in the contents of
different codes’ and such codes are ‘to be based on ILO standards’ (Promoting
Core Labour Standards 2001, 20-21). Moreover, it was said that corporate
social responsibility cannot be substituted for ratification and implementation of
labour standards at the government level. In other words, the danger is that such
schemes will be ineffective and that, ultimately, legal domestic sanctions are
needed. If such sanctions are not ultimately available, the Commission
considers that the force of EU economic pressure may be resorted to and should
prevail.
THE LEGALITY OF EXTERNAL COMPETENCE
A preliminary issue relating to competence is the extent to which the European
Union has the legal capacity to act in the international sphere: firstly, in the
reform of ILO institutional machinery and governance of the international
community; and secondly, in the protection of fundamental workers’ rights
through trade and aid conditionality. This section considers the technical
answers to these questions, with reference to the Treaty Establishing the
European Community and the Treaty on European Union.
Legally speaking, EU external competence may arise in three ways:
through express powers contained in the Treaties; by virtue of implied powers
arising from matters in which there is internal legislative competence; and,
finally, delegation of competence by Member States. These three sources of
                                                
29 This reflects conclusions already reached in the transatlantic labour dialogue: Joint Report
on the Main Issues Emerging from the EU-US I Symposium on Codes of Conduct and
International Labour Standards (1998).15
external competence are not as straightforward as this brief summary might
suggest. More convoluted issues relating to the external powers of the EU vis-à-
vis EU Member States have been considered progressively by the Court of
Justice, primarily in a series of Opinions, whose reasoning is often obscure. In
addition, it should be noted that the judgments delivered by the Court of Justice
on these matters were, in the main, prompted by the Commission which was
anxious to establish the extent of its competence abroad. In this sense, issues
surrounding the external and inter-institutional competence of the EU are
intricately entwined.
Competence, which arises by any of these means, can also be
distinguished by virtue of whether it is ‘exclusive’ or ‘shared’. In the 2001
Communication, the Commission referred to some initiatives which would be
the sole responsibility of the EU, such as the launch of an international dialogue
on trade and social development and promotion within the ILO of discussion on
further steps to reinforce the effectiveness of ILO supervision and
implementation of ILO standards. Other initiatives, such as increased support
for ILO technical assistance and discussion of core labour standards in
development organisations, were said to be a matter for the EC and Member
States together (Promoting Core Labour Standards, 21).
Express powers to exercise exclusive competence may arise by virtue of
Article 133 (ex. Art. 113) of the EC Treaty. This provision applies only to those
matters which come within the ambit of the ‘Common Commercial Policy’
(CCP) of the EU.
30 Express provision can also be made for ‘shared
competence’, as for example under Title XX of the EC Treaty which relates to
‘development co-operation’.
It seems likely that the incidental inclusion of ‘core labour standards’ in
WTO and other trade negotiations would come within the ambit of the CCP and
Article 133 EC. It was established early on that the Court would take a broad
view of CCP and accept that provisions governing international trade could
pursue objectives that were not primarily commercial, and would not exclude
exclusive EC competence on that basis.
31 This would explain the apparent lack
of controversy among Member States over the common position adopted in
                                                
30 See Art. 133(1) EC which states that ‘the common commercial policy shall be based on
uniform principles...’ and Art. 133(3) which states that ‘where agreements with one or more
States or international organisations need to be negotiated’, there is capacity for the
Commission to negotiate on behalf of the EU with the Council’s authorisation and guidance.
In so doing, the Council is to act by qualified majority vote (QMV).   
31 See Opinion 1/78 [1979] ECR 2871, paras 41-46 and Opinion 1/94 [1994] I-5267, paras
28-31. See for recent confirmation of this view, Opinion 2/00, 6 December 2001, paras 23
and 35, not yet reported but available at europa website.16
respect of ‘core labour standards’ represented by the European Commission in
the WTO Ministerial meetings.
32 This principle would not extend to an
agreement on international labour standards  per se, where the predominant
purpose is not trade-related; nor, for that reason would it provide competence
for EU representation within the ILO.
33 However, to the extent that protection
of core labour standards is incidental to ‘development agreements’, there would
seem to be shared competence between the EC and Member States under Title
XX of the EC Treaty.
34 It is perhaps for this reason that ‘trade’ and
‘development’ were emphasised in the proposed initiatives listed at the end of
the Communication on Promoting Core Labour Standards.
There remains the residual issue whether additional competence can be
claimed for the EU (in respect of core labour standards) outside incidental
inclusion in CCP or development, on the basis that these are implicit in the
internal powers of the EC.
35 Such implied powers are said to arise because ‘the
system of internal Community measures may not... be separated from that of
external relations’.
36 The judgment on point is Opinion 2/91, in which the Court
of Justice addressed explicitly EC competence to conclude ILO Convention No.
170 on Chemicals at Work.
37 This decision had to be made in the shadow of
litigation over the relative efficacy of ILO Convention No.89 on night work
(women) 1948, which restricted women’s ability to work at night and the Equal
Treatment Directive, which required equal treatment of the sexes.
38 The
judgment on ILO Convention No. 170, delivered by the Court of Justice,
therefore reflected recognition of the importance of future consistency between
ILO Conventions and EC directives. Nevertheless, while the Court of Justice
accepted that the EC possessed external competence by virtue of its
corresponding internal legislative competence in health and safety, such
competence was not found to be exclusive. These powers, which arose under
                                                
32 Despite Member State resistance to Commission claims to EU exclusive competence as
regards the GATS and TRIPS agreements. This dispute was later resolved by the finding that
competence was shared between the EU and Member States. See  Opinion 1/94 re WTO
Agreement [1994] ECR I-5267.
33 Cf. Opinion 2/00 (2001), n.31 above, para. 40.
34 For example, in the context of the Cotonou Agreement, competence is expressly shared
between the EU and Member States who are also parties to the agreement. See the Cotonou
Agreement 2000, Art. 1.
35 Case 22/70 Commission v Council [1971] ECR 263 (the ‘AETR case’), paras. 17 and 18.
36 Ibid., para. 19.
37 Opinion 2/91 regarding ILO Convention No. 170 on Chemicals at Work, Decision of 19
March 1993 [1993] ECR I-1061.
38 Council Directive 76/207 on the principle of equal treatment for men and women OJ 1976
L39/40. See as to the relative priority of Member States’ obligations, Case C-345/89 Stoeckel
[1991] ECR I-4047. See subsequently, Case C-158/91 Levy [1993] ECR I-4287; and Case C-
13/93 Minne [1994] ECR I-371. Discussed in Kilpatrick 1996.17
what was then Art. 118a EC, provided only for the adoption of minimum
legislative standards, as did certain rules adopted under Article 100 EC (now
Art. 94).
39 To the extent that EC rules did not seek to harmonise national labour
laws,
40 there remained scope for Member States to conclude international
standards that lay above this minimum and there was shared competence with
the Commission.
It would therefore seem that there is exclusive EU external competence in
respect of those core labour standards where the EC has laid down rules which
harmonise the laws of Member States. It is arguable that provisions of certain
directives might meet this standard, especially in the context of sex
discrimination law,
41 but that not all do.
42 In respect of the latter, the EU and
Member States will share competence within the ILO. No powers have been
exercised by the EU in the field of ‘forced labour’, although it is arguable that
they might arise under Article 137(3). In such circumstances, the EU and
Member States share powers; and the Member States retain the option to act
independently of the EU until that internal competence is exercised.
43 The
probable absence of Community powers in respect of ‘freedom of association’
and ‘the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining’
44 is more
problematic, in that this calls into question whether the EU should claim any
implied competence in respect of these particular core labour standards.
The last issue to be considered is whether, to the extent that there is any
absence of EU competence given the principles outlined above, this can be
remedied by the Member States which may formally delegate such powers to
the EU, acting under either Title V of the EU Treaty in the European Council or
Article 308 EC in Council. Joint action and common positions may be agreed
upon in the European Council by unanimity
45 and could provide the basis for
                                                
39 See for example Council Directive 80/1107/EEC on the protection of workers from the risk
related to chemical, physical and biological agents at work. OJ 1980 L327/8.
40  An example of harmonisation given by the Court of Justice was Council Directive
88/379/EEC on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of
the Member States relating to the classification, packaging and labelling of dangerous
preparations OJ 1988 L 187/14.
41 Council Directive 75/117/EC on the approximation of the laws of Member States relating
to the application of the principle of equal pay for men and women OJ 75/117/EEC, Art. 1.
42 Cf. the Council Directive on the protection of young people at work OJ L216/12 (Young
Person Directive), Art. 5, which provides for Member States to regulate the participation of
children in cultural or similar activities, as they see fit, with reference to criteria concerning
health, safety and access to education.
43 See Joined Cases 3,4,6/76  Kramer and Bais SNC v Netherlands [1976] ECR 1279;
discussed in Bourgeois 1999, at S165 et seq.
44 Art. 137(6) ECT, discussed in greater depth below.
45 Subject to the derogation in Art.23(2) TEU.18
EU representation within the ILO.
46 However, it is doubtful that all Member
States would consent to this rigid form of institutional arrangement. It is, after
all, the EU Member States who remain individually ILO Members and who are
to be held accountable for breach of standards adopted in ILO Conventions.
47
Alarm bells might also seem to ring when one considers the use of
Article 308 EC to achieve such external competence, following Opinion 2/94, in
which the Court of Justice indicated that this provision could not provide EC
competence to accede to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).
48
In its judgment, the Court of Justice observed that ‘no treaty provision confers
on the Community institutions any general power to enact rules on human rights
or to conclude international conventions in this field’.
49 Article 308 (ex Art.
235) EC could not fill this lacuna so as to enable EC accession to the ECHR,
since the protection of human rights could not be regarded as ‘one of the
objectives of the Community’.
50 While respect for human rights was ‘a
condition of the lawfulness of Community acts’, accession to the Convention
would require an active commitment to protect such rights that went beyond the
scope of the Community’s internal legal competence. This would also require
the entry of the Community into a distinct international institutional system.
This change would be of such constitutional significance that ‘it could only be
brought about by way of Treaty amendment’.
51
The principles stated in this judgment might seem pertinent to expansion
of EC competence under Article 308 EC in the realm of core labour standards,
since there are no express powers for the Community to enact rules on freedom
of association and collective bargaining and no apparent powers to conclude
international conventions on such matters. Nevertheless, it is to be doubted that
doing so would have such great constitutional significance as accession to the
ECHR; for while human rights protection could affect almost every aspect of
EC and EU law, the field of ‘social policy’ seems more narrowly demarcated.
Moreover, the issues of judicial jurisdiction that arose in Opinion 2/94 would
not necessarily arise here (cf. Burrows 1997, 62). Objections are only likely to
                                                
46 Given that there is no express basis for such powers within the acquis communitaire. See
Art.2 TEU.
47 To the extent that such accountability is achieved, as discussed above. See also for
acknowledgement of the institutional constraints of the ILO Constitution and the views of the
Governing Body on EU representation, Opinion 2/91, n.37 above, at I-1066/7.
48 Opinion 2/94  (1996) n.28 above.
49 Ibid., para. 27.
50 Ibid., para. 30.
51 Ibid., paras. 33-5. It is questionable whether such amendment is now desirable, given the
adoption of the new Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union adopted in 2000,
but it would appear to still be under consideration. Note that the Laeken Declaration 2001
once again opens the question of accession. Cf. Duvigneau 1999.19
arise to the extent that an attempt is made to devolve jurisdiction in respect of
‘core labour standards’ to ILO supervisory bodies. What is most probable is
that, as in the context of the Second Pillar, the requirement of unanimity will
effectively preclude the use of Article 308 EC to extend external competence in
the social field.
In conclusion, it would seem that exclusive external competence arises
only in respect of the incidental inclusion of core labour standards into
international instruments relating to trade, to the extent that these are regarded
as falling within the scope of the CCP. There is express shared competence in
respect of incidental inclusion of such standards in development agreements. It
would also seem that shared external competence can be implied in respect of
those core labour standards that there are powers to regulate under the EC
Treaty. Freedom of association and the effective protection of collective
bargaining seem to lie outside such implied competence. In this very limited
respect, there could be a challenge to EU external relations policy relating to
core labour standards, which does not touch on trade or development. Finally,
there remains the remote possibility that the EU Member States could agree
under Title V of the EU Treaty and Article 308 of the EC Treaty to make
international agreements in which protection of core labour standards is the
predominant objective or to provide for EU representation within the ILO.
THE LEGITIMACY OF EXTERNAL COMPETENCE
While there seems to be a potential legal basis for the implementation of
proposals made by the Commission in Promoting Core Labour Standards, there
remains a further question, which is whether EU intervention in this field should
be regarded as legitimate. The aims of the Commission may appear laudable
insofar as they promise protection of the fundamental rights of workers, but
there are two further concerns which arguably call to be addressed. The first is
whether the means by which the EU will represent Member States in
international fora is defensible in terms of the procedure followed and the
participants in that procedure. Here one could make reference to the
Commission’s own criteria for ‘good governance’ set out in the White Paper.
The second is whether the action is consistent with the social policy model
promoted within the EU.20
Openness, Participation and Accountability: Issues of
 EU Inter-Institutional Competence
As the White Paper on  European Governance asserts, it is the Commission
which has tended to play an executive role in the representation of EU interests
abroad and it seems to be anticipated in the Communication on Promoting Core
Labour Standards that it will also do so in this context. The Commission will
obviously not do so acting independently, but under a bargaining mandate set
by the Council, to which it is expected to adhere. If the Commission’s actions
lead to the conclusion of an international agreement, ratification and
implementation will again presumably have to be approved by Council. What is
more unclear is the role that the Parliament, the ‘social partners’ and other
elements of ‘civil society’ will play in this process.
Some indication may be found in an earlier Commission Proposal, made
in 1994, following the delivery of Opinion 2/91. This document detailed how, in
the Commission’s view, external competence should be exercised where this
was shared between the EC and Member States. The expectation in this
proposal was that, in response to ILO questionnaires, Member States would
consult national worker and employer organisations and then provide
information to the Commission which would formulate a single Community
position. Negotiations at the ILO would be conducted by the Commission in
accordance with Council guidelines, in consultation with a committee of the
Council. The Community viewpoint would be presented by the Presidency or
the Commission to the ILC on behalf of EC Member States. The latter would be
expected to be silent unless they had special expertise which would be of
assistance in presenting Community amendments to draft Conventions. Each
EC Member State would be expected to vote in accordance with the agreed joint
position. If an ILO instrument was adopted by the ILC, it should be submitted
to the EC institutions, together with competent national institutions, as the
competent authorities for ratification and implementation. Ultimately, after
consultation with the Member States, Parliament and national worker and
employer organisations, it would be for the Council to make a decision whether
the ILO Convention should be concluded by the Community and its Member
States.
52
The subsequent 1994 Council Resolution noted and appeared to approve
the recognition of a social dimension outside the EU and active EU
participation in this process. It was expressly observed that ‘the Union’s
                                                
52 Proposal for a Council Decision on the Exercise of the Community's External Competence
at International Labour Conferences in Cases Falling within the Joint Competence of the
Community and its Member States COM(94)2 final, 12.01.94; published also in (1994)
IJCLLIR 175, paras. 5.1-5.521
international competitiveness must be strengthened’ and that ‘relevant
discussions should be conducted constructively in the relevant fora, such as the
ILO, GATT or subsequently the WTO, for the future organization of
international trade and above all for combating forced and child labour and
securing freedom of association’.
53 Nevertheless, no formal institutional
arrangements were made to accommodate shared competence in the manner
suggested by the Commission.
The result is that there is little openness and accountability in the current
process. Something approximating a ‘common position’ on ILO negotiations
may be facilitated by the Commission, but this tends to take place on a more ad
hoc level at ILO meetings, rather than formally within an EU institutional
setting. This information is not made available on the europa website or
elsewhere. The statements made by the Commissioner for Employment and
Social Affairs at the ILC are relatively vague. There does not seem to be any
exercise of control by Council, which tends not to take any stance on
ratification of ILO Conventions by EU Member States. Instead, it is the
Commission that makes recommendations of this nature.
54
Moreover, the Commission’s 1994 Proposal now seems a little outdated.
Since then, increasing attention has been paid to the broader inclusion of ‘civil
society’ in EU decision-making. This is a theme which can be linked to
literature on ‘governance’ which is reflected in the White Paper on  European
Governance (see especially at 14-18). Questions then arise as to which civil
society institutions should be seen as ‘stakeholders’ in this context. This is
arguably all the more important within the tripartite context of the ILO.
The 1994 Proposal envisaged consultation of ‘social partners’, namely
management and labour, but only at the national level. Arguably, more attention
will have to be paid to the institution of European-level ‘social dialogue’
                                                
53 Council Resolution of 6 December 1994 on certain aspects for a European Union social
policy: a contribution to economic and social convergence in the Union OJC368/6-10,
23.12.94, esp. at recital 9
54 See, for example, 2000/581/EC: Commission Recommendation of 15 September 2000 on
the ratification of ILO Convention No. 182 of 1999 concerning the prohibition and
immediate action for the elimination of the worst forms of child labour (notified under
document number C(2000)2674); and 1999/130/EC/EC: Commission Recommendation of 18
November 1998 on ratification of ILO Convention No. 180 of 1996 concerning seafarers’
hours of work and the manning of ships (notified under document number C(1999)372). Note
that these Recommendations do not seem to have significant impact on whether Member
States do indeed ratify. Despite the Commission recommendation only Ireland, Sweden and
the UK have ratified Convention No. 180. ILO Convention No 181 on private employment
agencies 1997 has not been the subject of a Commission Recommendation. Nevertheless, it
has been ratified by Finland, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain.22
incorporated into Articles 137-9 of the EC Treaty after Amsterdam. At present
social dialogue between European worker and employer organisations is
formally restricted to legislative initiatives and sectoral regulation, not the
question whether to withdraw trade preferences or development aid (EC Treaty,
Articles 137-9; see Treu 1996 and Jacobs and Ojeda-Aviles 1999). If they are to
be more involved, interesting questions would arise as to how they should be
made accountable for their decisions. Moreover, it would seem timely to
address the alleged defects in the representativity of these organisations, which
has been raised repeatedly since the ‘social dialogue’ quasi-legislative process
came into operation (Betten 1998, Bernard 2000 and Syrpis 2000). It will also
be important that any combined positions taken by the EU within the ILO do
not restrict the voices of worker and employer representatives in State
delegations to the ILC.
The call for greater engagement with ‘civil society’ seems, at least in
part, designed to reduce the prominence of corporatist models of interest
representation and offer a more diverse range of interested NGOs a role in
decision-making.
55 The question then is which elements of ‘civil society’ should
be invited to play a role in consultation. It seems that such participants will also
have to establish their representative credentials (World Governance 2001, 15).
We know little at present about which organisations would be suitably
qualified, although it may be suspected that the Platform for Social NGOs,
which already works in co-operation with the European Trade Union
Confederation (ETUC), would be regarded as a suitable candidate.
56 Moreover,
one might expect the Economic and Social Committee to play a greater role;
57
although it seems that at least in the context of trade, the Commission prefers to
utilise a differently constituted ‘Civil Society Dialogue’.
58
If the role of ‘civil society’ is extended, caution may well need to be
exercised. As the Commission Working Group itself conceded, these new actors
will not necessarily ‘wield power in a more altruistic and beneficent way than
those before them, so, whatever the level of participation, policy-making needs
careful, transparent and accountable management to avoid abuse of power...’
(World Governance 2001, 15). Care will also have to be taken that the process
                                                
55 See Report of the Working Group No. 2a, Report of Working Group: Consultation and
Participation of Civil Society, June 2001.
56 Certainly, it is likely to regard itself as being so. See Platform of European Social NGOs,
Democracy, Governance and European NGOs: Building a Stronger Structured Civil
Dialogue (Brussels: 2001).
57 Ibid., 6. See however as to current concerns as to the ‘democratic deficit’ of the Economic
and Social Committee, Smismans 1999.
58 EC Commission, Future Policy Directions – A New Round: Trade Policy Review Body of
the WTO and the EU, Part IV.23
of consultation and dialogue is not so lengthy and unwieldy as to affect the
efficacy of Commission external representation. For example, Scharpf (2001, at
11) observes that ‘one cannot but wonder what would happen if the
Commission’s invitations were in fact taken seriously by most, or even by many
of the “civil society” actors all over Europe. Or since not a word is lost on the
practicalities of Europe-wide participation, one might wonder about the
seriousness of the invitation itself.’ In addition, the involvement of these groups
will have to be consistent with the ILO constitutional framework and practice.
Finally, the 1994 Proposal did not mention any role for the European
Parliament in establishing the bargaining mandate of the Commission. Its part
was to be limited to consultation over the conclusion and ratification of an
international agreement, which may be hard to oppose once adopted in an
International Labour Conference. This could now be modified to reflect the
Parliament’s additional participation in WTO negotiations, where the
Parliament does have the opportunity to at least discuss a summary of the
negotiating mandate after it has been adopted by Council (Woolcock 2000,
380). In European Governance, the Commission seems to contemplate a greater
role for the Parliament, as does the Parliament itself, on the basis that it is able
to supply the ‘democratic legitimacy’ that consultation with sectoral interests
lacks.
59 The challenge will be to so organise this aspect of EU inter-institutional
competence that openness, participation and accountability are achieved, but
that public disclosure of and extensive debate on the EU bargaining agenda
does not entirely undermine Commission representation in international fora.
The responses to the White Paper on European Governance suggest that
agreement on these matters may not be straightforward. The Commission has
been accused of trying to seize power at the expense of the Member States
(Scharpf 2001) or to reclaim influence which has been gained by the Parliament
(Heritier 2001). There is evidence of this in the White Paper where the
Commission uses the rhetoric of ‘shared competence’ and ‘multi-level
governance’, but ultimately states that a ‘clarification of roles must allow the
Commission to assume full executive responsibility’ ( European Governance
2001, 34). In doing so, the Commission may seem to be reducing openness,
participation and accountability, rather than bolstering these elements of ‘good
governance’. There will therefore need to be some kind of accord reached on
the application of these principles before the Commission can take on a more
prominent international role within ‘global social governance’.
                                                
59  European Parliament Resolution on the Commission White Paper on European
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Coherence: A Comparison Between External and Internal Competence in
the Field of Core Labour Standards
There are potential legal barriers to the achievement of EU external competence
in global social governance which stem from the notion of ‘coherence’, namely
that implied external powers cannot arise in respect of matters in which the EU
has no internal powers. There is, in addition, the importance of ‘coherence’ as
an ethical consideration.
It is argued here that it is primarily this ethical principle of ‘coherence’
that calls into question the legitimacy of certain aspects of EU enforcement of
‘core labour standards’ through trade and aid agreements. This is only to the
extent that the EU does not secure enforcement of certain core labour standards
within the EU Member States, but claims competence as an international actor
to require other States to do so (cf. Clapham 1999). Such considerations
potentially militate against the extension of EU external competence in this
field.
The 2001 Communication stated that ‘respect for labour standards’ is an
integral aspect of the ‘European social model’ ( Promoting Core Labour
Standards 2001, 10). Moreover, the Commission apparently considered that the
fundamental principles and rights at work identified in the 1998 ILO
Declaration already ‘apply in their entirety to the countries of the EU’
(Promoting Core Labour Standards 2001, 11).
This is correct to the extent that EU Member States are all members of
the ILO and have now ratified the seven ‘core’ ILO Conventions; in addition,
all bar Belgium and Germany, have now ratified Convention No. 182 on the
worst forms of child labour. It is also true that social rights are to a limited
extent protected within Europe under the auspices of the Council of Europe’s
Social Charter of 1961 (ESC).
60
Nevertheless, at present, EU Member States have a far from perfect
record of compliance with internationally recognised core labour standards. ILO
supervisory bodies have repeatedly found that UK legislation is in breach of
‘freedom of association’ under the core Conventions Nos. 87 and 98 (Ewing
1994 and Novitz 2000b).
61 In 2001 and 2002 concerns were also raised by the
                                                
60 For a discussion of the flawed supervisory machinery in operation under the European
Social Charter 1961 and its limitations when contrasted with that of the European Convention
on Human Rights 1950, see Novitz 2000a and Novitz 2002.
61 On the UK, see ILO Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and
Recommendations, Individual Observations Concerning Conventions Nos. 87 and No. 98
(UK) 2000, 2001 and 2002.25
Committee of Experts, supervising the application of ILO Conventions and
Recommendations, as regards breaches of freedom of association under
Austrian and Belgian works councils legislation, Danish shipping legislation,
German treatment of civil servants, Portuguese imposition of compulsory
arbitration and thresholds for establishment of a trade union. The Committee of
Experts also considers that Austria, France, Germany and the UK breach of ILO
Convention No. 29 concerning Forced Labour, by virtue of arrangements which
permit the acquisition of private profit from prison labour.
62
It is only by claiming that the ‘core labour standards’ set out in the 1998
ILO Declaration do not require compliance with the findings of ILO
supervisory bodies, can these States claim not to be in breach. Yet the stated
aim of the Commission Communication is to give ‘greater weight’ and greater
publicity’ to the observations of these organs and improve the effectiveness of
ILO complaints procedures (Promoting Core Labour Standards, 14).
What seems to be missing from the Commission’s analysis is recognition
of the limited scope of EC competence in the social field. Although the EU has
adopted extensive legislation relating to anti-discrimination law
63 and child
labour is tackled under the Young Persons Directive 1994,
64 there is at present
an absence of EU protection of other core labour standards. There are no
directives on forced labour, freedom of association and collective bargaining.
It is arguable that standards on forced labour could be introduced under
Art. 137(1) EC which contemplates the adoption of directives on ‘working
conditions’ by qualified majority voting in accordance with Art. 251 (ex Art.
189b) EC. The key difficulty lies with EU enforcement of freedom of
association and the right to engage in collective bargaining. Arguably, the EC
has no power to make rules on these subjects. In this respect, the European
social model is limited.
                                                
62 See ILOLEX at http://www.ilo.org. See also specific mention of the UK in Global Report
on Forced Labour (ILO, 2001), 59-60.
63 This was previously only as regards discrimination between men and women, See Art. 141
(ex. Art. 119) EC; also the key Equal Treatment and Equal Pay Directives, referred to above.
More recently, discrimination on other grounds has been addressed. See Council Framework
Directive 2000/78/EC on equal treatment in employment OJ 2000 L303/16 and Council
Directive 2000/43/EC on equal treatment irrespective of race or ethnic origin OJ 2000
L180/22. Note that provision for further measures remains possible under Arts 137(1) and
141 EC.
64 EC Directive 94/33 (1994) OJ L216/12; although for the UK this did not come into force
until 1998. See Fredman 1998, 394.26
Under Art. 137(3) EC, the Council acting unanimously can adopt
directives upon the ‘representation and collective defence of workers and
employers’. However, this power is subject to Art. 137(6) EC, which states that
‘the provisions of this Article shall not apply to... [ inter alia] the right of
association, the right to strike and the right to impose lock-outs’. It is
conceivable that a directive could be adopted under Article 94 (ex. Art. 100) or
Article 308 (ex Art. 235) EC, but the principle that the specialised treaty base
should prevail makes this course of action unlikely and potentially open to
challenge by Member States.
65 The right to strike has been recognised
incidentally in EC legislative initiatives, such as the ‘Monti’ Regulation, where
it is acknowledged as an exception to rules pertaining to free movement of
goods.
66 Nevertheless, in that Regulation the determination of the content of the
‘right to strike’ is to be defined by national laws. There is no European-level
definition or guarantee of protection of such a right.
It is possible for EU Member States to agree upon a Treaty amendment,
enabling them to set these minimum standards as crucial terms of competition
for the Union. The adoption of such measures reflecting ILO standards has been
called for by a range of academics (see Ryan 1997, 322-4; Wedderburn 1994;
and Germanotta and Novitz 2002).  Those who oppose such reform tend to rely
on argument that the industrial relations of Member States are too dissimilar for
any kind of harmonisation to be appropriate. This is a distortion of an argument
made some time ago by Kahn-Freund (1974), which seems flawed in two
respects. Firstly, only minimum standards need be envisaged, not
harmonisation. Differences in systems of collective bargaining and supervision
of trade union organisation could remain, as long as they could be said to be in
compliance with the bare bones of ILO Conventions. Secondly, these are basic
standards to which EU Member States have already consented as the most
appropriate grounds for assessment of the adequacy of national law and
practice. This is the debate which underlies the Commission proposals, but
which was not acknowledged in the Communication on  Promoting Core
Labour Standards.
There is potential for ‘fundamental’ workers’ rights to be protected
through the ‘general principles’ jurisprudence of the Court of Justice. For
example, collective agreements have been identified by the Court as an
                                                
65 Cf. Case C-84/94 UK v Council [1996] ECR I-5755. See also Dashwood 1996.
66 Council Regulation (EC) No. 2679/98 (1998) OJ L337/8, Art. 2. Note however, that it has
been questioned whether this mention of the right to strike in an EC instrument, albeit
significant, is sufficient to ensure that the exercise of industrial action is not progressively
limited by the project of market integration. See Orlandini, 2000, 358.27
exception to normal rules governing fair competition.
67 However, this
protection will arise only in the form of an exception to express provisions
contained in the Treaty, regulations and directives or as guidance for the
appropriate implementation of such measures. The EU Charter of Fundamental
Rights 2000, which refers to the core labour standards, could be used by the
Court of Justice as a guide to the appropriate exercise of this jurisprudence.
68
The Charter, like its predecessor, the Community Charter of the Fundamental
Social Rights of Workers 1989, makes express reference not only to non-
discrimination
69 and prohibition of child labour,
70 but also to prohibition of
slavery and forced labour,
71 freedom of association,
72 and rights of collective
bargaining and action.
73 Nevertheless, the Court of Justice has shown a marked
preference for reference to the provisions of the European Convention on
Human Rights than those of instruments which provide for socio-economic
rights.
74 This practice may need to be revised before the Charter has significant
impact upon the Court’s jurisprudence. Moreover, while the rights listed in the
Charter are likely to constrain and guide both the EU institutions and Member
States in their creation and implementation of EU law, the Charter is not a legal
basis for new legislative initiatives in the realm of forced labour, freedom of
association or the right to strike (see Art. 51(2); discussed in Betten 2001, 162-
3; de Burca 2001, 136-7; and Goldsmith 2001).
The only remaining potential for protection of freedom of association and
effective collective bargaining is via the EC ‘soft law’ tools: the Open Method
of Co-Ordination (OMC) and ‘corporate social responsibility’. There may be
scope under Article 140 (ex Art. 118c) EC for the Commission to ‘encourage
co-operation between the Member States’ and to ‘facilitate the co-ordination of
their action’ in terms of the right of association and collective bargaining.
However, this does not as yet extend to the benchmarking and process of review
                                                
67  Case C-67/96  Albany International  [1999] ECR I-5751; Joined Cases C-115-117/97
Brentjens [1999] ECR I-6025; and Case C-219/97 Maatschappij [1999] ECR I-6121. See
more recently van der Woude [2000] ECR I-7111. See for analysis of these cases, Evju 2001
and Sciarra 2002.
68 See reference to the Charter as a significant source in Case C-173/99 BECTU [2001] ECR
I-4881, in the Opinion of AG Tizzano at paras 26-7.
69 EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (EUCFR), esp. Arts 21 and 23, but see also the entirety
of Chapter III titled ‘Equality’.
70 EUCFR, Art. 32.
71 EUCFR, Art. 5.
72 EUCFR, Art. 12.
73 EUCFR, Art. 28.
74 Betten 2001,157-8 observes that since 1989 the Court of Justice has referred only once to
the 1989 Charter as supportive evidence. Also, status is given to the ECHR in preference to
the ESC and ILO Conventions which protect socio-economic rights. See Report of the Expert
Group on Fundamental Rights, Affirming Fundamental Rights in the European Union: Time
to Act (European Commission DG for Employment and Social Affairs, 1999), 14.28
under OMC and there is no indication that such progression is envisaged by the
Commission. Moreover, while respect for core labour standards is one aim of a
European ‘corporate responsibility’ strategy (see  Corporate Social
Responsibility 2001, 14-15), the content of that strategy remains too vague and
uncertain to provide a means for effective implementation of such standards
within the EU. Business seems reluctant to support further regulation by the
EU, given the scope of other global initiatives such as the recent revision of the
OECD Guidelines and ILO Tripartite Declaration of Principles.
75 The response
of the Council seems to reflect the mood of the corporate lobby. The Council
Resolution 2001 on ‘Corporate Responsibility’ acknowledged a role for the EU
in promoting initiatives aimed at exchange of good practice, training in this
field and provision of information on the economic advantages of social
responsibility. However, it asked the Commission to ‘query carefully the added
value of any new action proposed at European level’ and emphasised ‘the
importance of the social partners’ contribution to the consultation process at
national and European level’.
76 It is difficult to see how this will ensure
effective protection of fundamental workers’ rights otherwise excluded from EC
regulation.
There was therefore a lacuna in the Commission Communication on
Promoting Core Labour Standards, in so far as there was no admission of any
failing on the part of EU Member States to comply with those standards
designated as fundamental by the ILO. There was also no appreciation of the
inability of the EU to act (at present) to enforce such standards within the
Union.
Ethical arguments stemming from ‘coherence’ as opposed to
‘effectiveness’ did not seem to concern the Commission; nor do they appear
likely to upset Member States, who suffer no harm from such a policy.
Nevertheless, it is worth remembering that this is an argument that is likely to
be raised by international actors outside the EU. For example, it could arise in
the context of WTO dispute settlement.
Despite WTO dispensation, there remains the possibility that those States
excluded from preferential agreements or disadvantaged by arrangements could
                                                
75 See CEEP Opinion on the European Commission Green Paper, ‘Promoting a European
Framework for Corporate Social Responsibility’, December 2001, CEEP.2001/AVIS.21; and
Corporate Social Responsibility: UNICE Position, December 2001 and ICC Comments on
the European Commission Green Paper, ‘Promoting a European Framework for Social
Responsibility’, 20 December 2001, SB/am.
76 Council Resolution on Follow-up to the Green Paper on Corporate Social Responsibility
3.12.2001, available on:
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bring a complaint within the dispute settlement procedure of the WTO.
77 If so,
the EU might wish to justify its policy under Article XX (or ‘general
exceptions’ clause) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
with reference to ILO standards and, in particular, the 1998 Declaration. There
is increasing pressure on the WTO panels and appellate body to refer to other
international instruments in the interpretation of Article XX (see Petersmann
2001, Marceau 1999 and Blackett 1999). Nevertheless, for the EU to do so will
not be straightforward.
The application of Article XX involves a two-tier test,
78 the second limb
of which may be difficult for the EU to satisfy. The first test is to check whether
protection of ‘core labour standards’ comes within the list of legitimate
exceptions set out in Article XX. Arguably, this is possible, for example, under
the head of (a) ‘public morals’, (b) protection of human life or health, and (e)
measures taken ‘relating to the products of prison labour’. The second
consideration is whether the preference in question is ‘a means of arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination between countries’ or ‘a disguised restriction on
international trade’.
There is a risk that EU practice will be regarded as arbitrary or
discriminatory and will lie outside Article XX if compliance with core labour
standards is not required uniformly of other States. If EU compliance with core
labour standards does not measure up to that required of other States, such
conditionality may be regarded as ‘a disguised restriction on international
trade’.
It might be argued that principles of ‘proportionality’ should be applied,
such that the EU may be entitled to take measures against States who blatantly
violate core labour standards, where only minor violations are recorded in
respect of EU States. For example, a comparison might be drawn between a
State which prohibits any form of trade union organisation versus a State (like
Germany) which prohibits strikes by a certain category of civil servant.
However, whether such an approach is entirely satisfactory might be
questionable, in that ILO supervisory bodies has been at pains to set out the full
content of minimum labour standards and the WTO panels may not wish to
                                                
77 For example, the Thai government is now protesting against its lack of access to additional
tariff preferences under EU GSP, by reason of Thai failure to contain the illegal drugs trade.
See Thai Communication, 12 December 2001, G/L/506, discussed in  Financial Times,
10.02.02. One can imagine a comparable case arising where a State protests against its failure
to qualify for such preferences by reason of non-compliance with certain labour standards.
78 WTO Appellate Body on  US-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional
Gasoline, adopted 20.05.1996 (WT/DS2), 22; and WTO Appellate Body Report on  US-
Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, adopted 6.11.1998, para. 150.30
depart from the criteria for compliance identified in the appropriate specialist
forum. What is at least clear is that the EU should not seek to enforce those
aspects of ILO core labour standards which are not applied within EU Member
States.
CONCLUSION
This paper has sought to explain the context within which the Commission
Communication on Promoting Core Labour Standards was issued, to outline its
content and to subject to detailed examination the legality and legitimacy of the
measures recommended. For, as the White Paper on  European Governance
acknowledges, it is not only the substance of supra-national norms which
matters but also how they are defined and by whom they are implemented.
My aim in doing so is not to undermine the importance or validity of
those ‘core labour standards’ identified by the ILO; nor is it to obstruct the
ongoing search for a means by which to make such standards enforceable on the
world stage. Instead, my purpose is to subject the Commission proposals for the
extension of EU competence in this field to careful scrutiny, so as to ensure
their viability.
It emerges that, while the EU may possess the legal powers to execute
many of the recommendations contained in Promoting Core Labour Standards,
there are limitations upon those powers which should also be acknowledged.
There is in addition a need, highlighted by the White Paper, to pay detailed
attention to the mechanics of EU representation in international organisations.
Furthermore, it is important to recognise the potential which remains to
challenge the legitimacy of the Commission’s trade and aid policy, especially in
the sphere of freedom of association and collective bargaining. Indeed, the
limited internal competence of the EU as regards ‘core labour standards’ in this
field suggests that the Commission is seeking to export a phoney representation
of a ‘European Social Model’. If EU Member States are placed under no
pressure by the EU to comply with certain core labour standards, the question
may be asked as to why should such pressure be exerted by the EU elsewhere?
It has been argued here that these are concerns which need to be
addressed by the Commission. Otherwise, the Commission may fail to convince
the European citizenry of its desire to achieve ‘global social governance’; nor is
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